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Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 7 (Feb. 24, 2022)1
FAMILY LAW: INTERPRETTING THE CHILD’S “BEST INTERESTS” OF RELOCATION
BY CONSIDERING THE CUSTODY “BEST INTEREST” FACTORS
Summary
The Nevada Court of Appeals interpreted the best interests provision of Nevada’s child
relocation statute, NRS 125C.007(1). The Court questioned the relevant application of the custody
best interest factors, as well as the applicable evidentiary standard. Because neither legislative
history nor Nevada Supreme Court jurisprudence provided answers, the Court construed
legislative intent based upon reasonability. The Court concluded that (1) the threshold relocation
statute requires district courts to make specific findings regarding whether relocation is in the best
interests of the child, to include the custody best interest factors, and tie those findings to its ruling;
and (2) the appropriate burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence.2
Background
In 2012, M.M. was born to Amanda Kaitlyn Hogan and Anthony Jacob Monahan. In 2015,
M.M.’s parents stipulated to, and the district court ordered, joint legal and physical custody. But
when her stepfather, a Navy lieutenant, was assigned to Naval Air Station Fallon, M.M. relocated
an hour away from Monahan. Hogan then moved the district court to modify custody to reflect her
de facto primary custody status. 3 In March 2019, the district court granted Hogan primary physical
custody. The order found that the custody best interest factors favored M.M.’s move, further noting
that her stepfather’s work may require future relocations. Seven months later, the district court
held a hearing to determine exact parenting time. The court’s November order did so, while
“incorporat[ing] by reference in its entirety” its March 2019 primary custody order.
In June 2020, Hogan moved to relocate with M.M. again. This time, to Virginia Beach
where her husband had been reassigned. Monahan opposed the motion. Three months later, the
district court held an evidentiary hearing. Monahan, applying the custody best interest factors,
argued that it was not in M.M.’s best interests to relocate under NRS 125C.007(1)(b). Hogan
objected to the custody factors’ relevance, contending they were inapplicable because the hearing
concerned relocation. The district court allowed the argument because threshold statute’s second
provision includes the term “best interests.” But after hearing the evidence, the district court ruled
that the custody best interest factors did not change the relocation analysis.
In October 2020, the district court granted Hogan’s motion to relocate. The order analyzed
each NRS 125C.007(1) provision and each NRS 125C.007(2) relocation factor and made relevant
findings. The district court incorporated by reference and reevaluated its best interest findings from
its November 2019 order to find that relocation did not modify any prior best interest factor
findings. As such, it was in M.M.’s best interest to relocate to Virginia. Monahan appealed.
On appeal, Monahan claimed that the district court abused its discretion by incorporating
its previous orders’ custody best interest findings to satisfy NRS 125C.007(1)(b) in its October
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2020 order. That is, Monahan argued that the statute’s inclusion of “best interests” required the
district court to analyze the custody factors anew when considering relocation. Hogan countered
that because she was already the primary physical custodian and she moved for relocation under a
statute that did not require a custody determination, the custody factors were unneeded to
determine the child’s best interests.4 Hogan also emphasized that the district court did consider the
custody factors and its relocation decision remained unaffected. Because both interpretations of
how to determine the “best interests of the child” under NRS 125C.007(1)(b) were reasonable, the
Nevada Court of Appeals had to decide how this phrase, in this context, must be applied.
Discussion
Background of Nevada’s child relocation statutes
Relocation of children following the dissolution of the parents’ relationship is one of the
most difficult issues that courts resolve. Courts must balance the custodial parent’s interest in
freedom of movement, the nonrelocating parent’s rights and relationship with the child, and the
state’s interest in protecting the child’s best interests.5 Efforts to balance these considerations have
manifested in various statutes.
NRS 125C.200 replaced Nevada’s original relocation statute, NRS 125A.350.6 The former
narrowed the latter’s applicability to custodial parents who sought relocation. 7 Later, the
legislature added three more relocation statutes. NRS 125C.006 and NRS 125C.0065 expanded
the scope of relocation to include both custodial parents and joint custodians. And NRS 125C.007
essentially codified factors district courts were already required to consider when deciding on
relocation.8
NRS 125C.007 was disputed here; namely, the second provision of the threshold test. The
plain language of NRS 125C.007(1)(b) requires that the district court must find relocation itself is
in the child’s best interests. 9 But the statute does not define “best interests of the child” or specify
the sufficient burden of proof. And it does not clarify, as debated here, whether the district court
must apply and make specific findings as to each custody best interest factor in NRS 125C.0035(4)
when making an NRS 125C.007(1)(b) decision.
NRS 125C.007(1)(b)’s “best interests of the child”
The “best interests of the child” standard underlies most judicial decision making in
relevant family law matters. But the standard can have different meanings in different contexts.
Here, the parties disputed the term’s meaning within NRS 125C.007(1)(b). On the one hand, as
Monahan argued, “best interests” may require district courts to consider the custody best interest
factors due to the statutes’ similar language and close proximity. On the other hand, as Hogan
contends, the distinct language could indicate the legislature’s intent to allow district courts to
decide relocation without requiring any particular factors. Because both parties had introduced
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reasonable interpretations, the Court concluded the term lacked clear meaning. And because the
statute was unclear, the Court interpreted what the legislature intended it to mean.
The Court referenced legislative history and Nevada Supreme Court jurisprudence to
discern the term’s meaning. Legislative history did not contain a connotation for relocation
specifically; however, it implied that the statute was a codification of then-existing state case law. 10
And while the case law gave context to other NRS 125C.007(1)(b) language,11 it did not clarify
“best interests of the child.” Because neither legislative history nor Nevada Supreme Court
authority explained the “best interests of the child” in NRS 125C.007(1)(b), the Nevada Court of
Appeals interpreted legislative intent in light of what was reasonable.
“Reasonably, every custody best interest factor need not be applied anew when the
relocating parent is already a primary physical custodian.” NRS 125C.0065 requires that joint
custodians who seek relocation must also petition the court for primary custody to relocate. NRS
125C.006, the notice statute for primary custodians, does not. Mandating a custody best interest
analysis for NRS 125C.007(1)(b) decisions would obscure the distinction between the two notice
statutes, essentially forcing the primary custodian to prove why they should retain primary custody.
The requirement would also result in a fourteen part threshold test before proceeding to an only
six factor relocation analysis. The Court concluded that was unreasonable. But the Court noted
that district courts should consider the custody best interest factors because it shall consider any
factors it deems relevant concerning relocation.12
In any case, the district court is required to make specific findings and tie them to its
conclusion regarding the child’s best interests. In this case, the district court made findings of
M.M.’s actual advantages of moving to Virginia under the third provision of the threshold
relocation test. The Nevada Court of Appeals found that failure to restate those findings, which
overlap with the child’s best interests, under the second provision were not fatal to the best interests
determination. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
NRS 125.007(1)’s burden of proof necessary
The burden of proof necessary to satisfy the “best interests of the child” for relocation was
not disputed by the parties. However, the Court chose to address the applicable evidentiary
standard, because it is integrally related to interpreting the statute. The Court considered that
because NRS 125C.007(1)(b) is a threshold provision, it may not require as rigorous an analysis
as the six relocation factors. But preponderance of the evidence is the default evidentiary standard
in family law unless the statute states otherwise. 13 Neither the statute itself nor legislative history
discusses evidentiary burdens for any of the NRS 125C.007 provisions.14 As such, the Court held
that the relocating parent must prove all threshold provisions of NRS 125C.007(1) by a
preponderance of the evidence.
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Conclusion
The Nevada Court of Appeals clarified the indeterminate meaning of the “best interests of
the child” within NRS 125C.007(1). To balance the custodial parent’s interest in pursuing life
outside of the state and the noncustodial parent’s interest in maintaining a close relationship with
the child, the Court ruled that district courts may use the custody best interest factors to make a
relocation decision. That is, the Court affirmed the district courts’ discretion in how to determine
the best interests of the child under NRS 125C.007(1)(b). Still, district courts must make specific
“best interests” findings and tie those to its conclusion regarding relocation. The Court further
specified that the findings for all three threshold provisions of Nevada’s child relocation statute
must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.

